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SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS?
LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA*
Cass R. Sunstein

INTRODUCTION
Here is one of the central differences between late
eighteenth-century constitutions and late twentiethcentury constitutions: The former make no mention of
rights to food, shelter, and health care, whereas the latter
tend to protect those rights in the most explicit terms. A
remarkable feature of international opinion - firmly
rejected in the United States - is that socio-economic
rights deserve constitutional protection.
But should a democratic constitution really protect
the right to food, shelter, and medical care? Do "socioeconomic" rights of this sort belong in a constitution?
What do they have to do with citizenship? Do they
promote or undermine democratic deliberation? If such
rights are created, what is the role of the courts?
My aim in this essay is to shed light on these
questions, largely by discussing an extraordinary decision
by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, one that
carries some significant lessons for the future. In the
Grootboomt decision, the Court set out a novel and
promising approach to judicial protection of socioeconomic rights. This approach requires close attention
to the human interests at stake and sensible prioritysetting, without mandating protection for each person
whose socio-economic needs are at risk. The distinctive
virtue of the Court's approach in Grootboom is that it is
respectful of democratic prerogatives and of the limited
nature of public resources, while also requiring special
deliberative attention to those whose minimal needs are
not being met. The approach of the Constitutional Court
stands as a powerful rejoinder to those who have
contended that socio-economic rights do not belong in a
constitution. It suggests that such rights can serve, not to
preempt democratic deliberation, but to ensure
democratic attention to important interests that might
otherwise be neglected in ordinary debate. It also

A different version of this essay will appear as a chapter in Cass
R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What ConstitutionsDo
(Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2001).
Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2000
(11) BCLR 1169 (CC) [hereinafter Grootboom].
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illuminates the idea, emphasized by the Court itself, that
all rights, including the most conventional and
uncontroversial, impose costs that must be borne by
taxpayers.
To be sure, it is far too early to say whether the
Court's approach can fully accommodate the concerns of
those who object tojudicial protection of socio-economic
rights. But for the first time in the history of the world, a
constitutional court has initiated a process that might well
succeed in the endeavor of ensuring that protection,
without placing courts in an unacceptable managerial
role. This point has large implications for how we-think
about citizenship, democracy, and minimal social and
economic needs.

A DEBATE

AND A RESOLUTION

In General
For many years, there has been a debate about
whether social and economic rights, sometimes known as
socio-economic rights, belong in a constitution.' The
debate has occurred with special intensity in both Eastern
Europe and South Africa. Of course, the American
Constitution,and most constitutions before the twentiethcentury, protected such rights as free speech, religious
liberty, and sanctity of the home, without creating rights
to minimally decent conditions of life. But in the late
twentieth-century, the trend is otherwise, with
international documents, and most constitutions, creating
rights to food, shelter, and more.
Some skeptics have doubted whether such rights
make sense from the standpoint of constitutional design.
On one view, a constitution should protect "negative"

2

See C. Scott and P. Macklem, "Constitutional Ropes of Sand or
Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South African
Constitution" (1992) 141 U. Pa.. L Rev. 1; N. Haysom,
"Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-Economic
Rights" (1992) 8 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 451; E. Mureinik, "Beyond
a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution (1992)
8 S.Aft. J. Hum. Rts. 464; D. M. Davis, "The Case Against the
Inclusion of Socio-Economic Demands in a Bill of Rights Except
as Directive Principles" (1992) 8 S.Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 475.
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rights, not "positive" rights. Constitutional rights should
be seen as individual protections against the aggressive
state, not as private entitlements to protection by the
state. For people who share this view, a constitution is
best understood as a bulwark of liberty, properly
conceived; and a constitution that protects "positive"
rights can be no such bulwark, because it requires
government action, rather than creating a wall of
immunity around individual citizens.
But there are many problems with this view. Even
conventional individual rights, like the right to free
speech and private property, require governmental action.
Private property cannot exist without a governmental
apparatus, ready and able to secure people's holdings as
such. So-called negative rights are emphatically positive
rights. In fact all rights, even the most conventional, have
costs.' Rights of property and contract, as well as rights
of free speech and religious liberty, need significant
taxpayer support. In any case, we might well think that
the abusive or oppressive exercise of government power
consists, not only in locking people up against their will,
or in stopping them from speaking, but also in producing
a situation in which people's minimal needs are not met.
Indeed, protection of such needs might be seen as part of
the necessary wall of immunity, rather than as
inconsistent with it.
If the central concerns are citizenship and
democracy, the line between negative rights and positive
rights is hard to maintain. The right to constitutional
protection

of

p

fJProperjy hs a

luJli
UI0I1IU .441,

especially because those who would benefit from them
lack political power. It is not clear if this is true in every
nation, but it is certainly true in many places.
Perhaps more interestingly, critics of socio-economic
rights have made a point about democratic institutions. In
particular, they have argued that socio-economic rights
are beyond judicial capacities.4 On this view, courts lack
the tools to enforce such guarantees. If they attempt to do
so, they will find themselves in an impossible managerial
position, one that might discredit the constitutional
enterprise as a whole. How can courts possibly oversee
budget-setting priorities? If a state provides too little help
to those who seek housing, maybe it is because the state
is concentrating on the provision of employment, or on
public health programs, or on educating children. Is a
court supposed to oversee the full range of government
programs, to ensure that the state is placing emphasis on
the right areas? How can a court possibly acquire the
knowledge, or make the value judgments, that would
enable it to do that? There is a separate point: A judicial
effort to protect socio-economic rights might seem to
compromise, or to preempt democratic deliberation on
crucial issues, because it will undermine the capacity of
citizens to choose, in accordance with their own
judgments, the kinds of welfare and employment
programs that they favour. Of course some of these points
hold for conventional rights as well. But perhaps social
and economic rights are especially troublesome on this
count, because they put courts in the position of
overseeing large-scale bureaucratic institutions.

.

justification: If people's holdings are subject to ongoing
governmental adjustment, people cannot have the
security, and independence, that the status of citizenship
requires. The right to private property should not be seen
as an effort to protect wealthy people; rather, it helps
ensure deliberative democracy itself. But the same things
can be said for minimal protections against starvation,
homelessless, and other extreme deprivation. For people
to be able to act as citizens, and to be able to count
themselves as such, they must have the kind of
independence that such minimal protections ensure.
On the other hand, a democratic constitution does not
protect every right and interest that should be protected in
a decent or just society. Perhaps ordinary politics can be
trusted; if so, there is no need for constitutional
protection. The basic reason for constitutional guarantees
is to respond to problems faced in ordinary political life.
If minimal socio-economic rights will be protected
democratically, why involve the constitution? The best
answer is to doubt the assumption and to insist such
rights are indeed at systematic risk in political life,

It would be possible to respond to these institutional
concerns in various ways. Perhaps constitutions should
not include socio-economic rights at all. Perhaps such
rights should be included, but on the explicit
understanding that the legislature, and not the courts, will
be entrusted with enforcement. Section IV of the Indian
Constitution expressly follows this route, contains
judicially unenforceable "directive principles" and
attempts to encourage legislative attention to these rights
without involving the judiciary. The advantage of this
approach is that it ensures that courts will not be
entangled with administration of social programs. The
disadvantage is that without judicial enforcement, there
is a risk that the constitutional guarantees will be mere
"parchment barriers," meaningless or empty in the real
world.

See S. Holmes & C. R. Sunstein, The Cost ofRights: Why Liberty

Depends on Taxes (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999).

See Davis, supra note 2.
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The Case of South Africa
The appropriate approach to socio-economic rights
was intensely debated before ratification of the South
African Constitution.5 The idea of including socioeconomic rights was greatly spurred on by international
law, above all by the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 6 to which I will
return. Much of the debate involved the appropriate role
of the judiciary. In part, this was a relatively abstract
debate, posing a concrete real-world issue but founded on
a set of theoretical considerations just sketched, involving
judicial capacities and the proper place, if any, of socioeconomic rights in a democratic constitution. But aside
from these points, the debate was greatly influenced by
the particular legacy of apartheid and by claims about
what to do about that legacy at the constitutional level. In
the view of many of those involved in constitutional
design, the apartheid system could not plausibly be
separated from the problem of persistent social and
economic deprivation. In the end, the argument for socioeconomic rights was irresistible, in large part because
such guarantees seemed an indispensable way of
expressing a commitment to overcome the legacy of
apartheid - the overriding goal of the new Constitution.
We should emphasize a general point here about
constitutionalism.7 Some constitutions are preservative;
they seek to maintain existing practices, to ensure that
things do not get worse. This is of course Edmund
Burke's conception of the English constitution. By
contrast, some constitutions are transformative; they set
out certain aspirations that are emphatically understood
as a challenge to longstanding practices. They are defined
in opposition to those practices. The American
Constitution is a mixture of preservative and
transformative features, with some provisions looking
backward, and others very much looking forward. The
South African Constitutionis the world's leading example
of a transformative constitution. A great deal of the
document is an effort to eliminate apartheid "root and
branch." Constitutions are often described as
precommitment strategies, designed to ensure against
myopic or mistaken decisions in ordinary politics.' If it is
apt to describe the South African Constitution in these
terms, this is because the document is designed to ensure

6
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The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, Act. No.
108 of 1996. See Grootboom,supranote I at para. 20; see also M.
Chaskalson et al., Constitutional Law of South Africa (Cape
Town: Juta, 2000) 41-3 - 41-4.
InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights,
GA Res. 2200A (XXI), UN GAOR, 21 Sess., Supp. No. 16, UN
Doc. A/6316 (1966).
See L. Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York:
Basic Books, 1999).
See S. Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of
LiberalDemocracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

that future governments do not fall prey to anything like
the evils of the apartheid era. The creation of socioeconomic rights is best understood in this light.

A Continuing Debate
But what, in particular, is the relationship among
socio-economic rights, courts, and legislatures? The
South African Constitutionhardly speaks unambiguously
on this topic. The rights in question typically take the
following form, in an evident acknowledgment of limited
resources:
1. 'Everyone has the right to [the relevant good].
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and
other measures, within its available resources, to
achieve the progressive realization of this right.
This is the basic form of constitutional rights to "an
environment that is not harmful to their health or wellbeing" (section 24); housing (section 26); and health,
food, water, and social security (section 27).
A provision of this kind does not clearly create or
disable judicial enforcement. On the basis of the text
alone, it would be easy to imagine a judicial ruling to the
effect that enforcement is reserved to nonjudicial actors
within "the state." On this view, the South African
Constitution is, with respect to judicial enforcement,
closely akin to the Indian Constitution.But it would also
be easy to imagine a ruling to the effect that courts are
required to police the relevant rights, by ensuring that the
state has, in fact, taken "reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve
progressive realisation of this right." If, for example, the
state has done little to provide people with decent food
and health care, and if the state is financially able to do
much more, it would seem that the state has violated the
constitutional guarantee.
In certifying the Constitution, the South African
Constitutional Court resolved this question in just this
way, concluding that socio-economic rights are indeed
subject tojudicial enforcement.' The Court said that such
rights "are, at least to some extent, justiciable."'" The fact
that resources would have to be expended on them was
hardly decisive, for this was true of "many of the civil
and political rights entrenched"" in the Constitution.The
Court correctly said that many rights, including so-called
negative rights, "will give rise to similar budgetary

9

Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, Re
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at para. 78.

1O Ibid.
II Ibid.
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implications without compromising theirjusticiability."' 2
But in a final sentence, the Court added new ambiguity,
by suggesting that "at the very minimum, socio-economic
rights can be negatively protected from improper
invasion."' 3 This last sentence added considerable
ambiguity, because it did not say whether and when
courts could go beyond the "minimum" to protect rights
"positively", nor did it make entirely clear what it would
mean to invade socio-economic rights "negatively."
Perhaps the Court's suggestion was that when the state,
or someone else, actually deprived someone of (for
example) shelter, say by evicting them from the only
available source of housing, judicial enforcement would
be appropriate. But if this is what the Court meant, the
socio-economic rights would hardly be justiciable at all;
this would be an exceedingly narrow use of judicial
authority in overseeing the relevant rights.
The ultimate outcome of the debate over judicial
protection of socio-economic rights carries both
particular and general interest. It is of particular interest
in South Africa, where a substantial percentage of the
population lives in desperate poverty. Does the
Constitution do anything to help them? For example,
might the judiciary play a role in ensuring that
governmental priorities are set in the way that the
Constitution apparently envisages? Or might judicial
involvement in protecting socio-economic rights actually
impair reasonable legislative efforts to set sensible
priorities? The outcome has general interest because it
should tell us a great deal about the social and democratic
bad, of o
consequences, both good a
provisions creating socio-economic rights. Thus far
discussion of this issue has been both highly speculative
and uninformed by actual practice.' The South African
experience will inevitably provide a great deal of
information.
The Constitutional Court has now rendered its first
major decision involving these rights, in a case involving
the right to shelter. It is to that case that I now turn.

THE BACKGROUND
The Housing Shortage and the Apartheid
Legacy
It is impossible to understand the South African
dispute over the right to shelter, or the proceedings in the
Constitutional Court, without reference to the effects of

12
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Ibid.
Ibid.
An exception is Hungary. See A. Sajo, "How the Rule of Law
Killed Hungarian Welfare Reform" (1996) 5 E. Eur. Const. Rev.
31.

apartheid. The central point is that in the view of most
observers, the system of apartheid is directly responsible
for the acute housing shortage in many areas of the
nation.
One of the central components of apartheid was a
system of "influx control" that sharply limited African
occupation of urban areas. 5 In the Western Cape, the
government attempted to exclude all African people and
to give preference to the colored community. The result
was to freeze the provision of housing for African people
on the Cape Peninsula in 1962. Nonetheless, African
people continued to move into the area in search of jobs.
Lacking formal housing, large numbers of them moved
into "informal settlements," consisting of shacks and the
like, throughout the Peninsula. The inevitable result of
the combination of large African movements into urban
areas and inadequate provision of housing was to produce
shortages, amounting to over 100,000 units by the mid1990s. Since that time, governments at national and local
levels have enacted a great deal of legislation to try to
handle the problem. Nonetheless, many thousands of
people lack decent housing. At the same time, the South
African Government has limited sources and a large
variety of needs, stemming from the AIDS crisis,
pervasive unemployment (about 40%), and persistent,
pervasive poverty. 6

Grootboom and Wallacedene
The Grootboom case was brought by 900 plaintiffs,
510 of whom were children. For a long period, the
plaintiffs lived in an informal squatter settlement named
Wallacedene. Most of the people there were desperately
poor. All of them lived in shacks, without water, sewage,
or refuse removal services. Only 5% of the shacks had
electricity. The named plaintiff, Irene Grootboom, lived
with her family and that of her sister in a shack of about
twenty square meters.' 7
Many of those at the Wallacedene settlement had
applied for low-cost housing from the municipality. They
were placed on a waiting list, where they remained for a
number of years. In late 1998, they became frustrated by
the intolerable conditions at Wallacedene. They moved
out and put up shacks and shelters on vacant land that
was privately owned and earmarked for formal low-cost
housing. A few months later, the owner obtained an
ejectment order against them. But Grootboom and others
refused to leave, contending that their former sites were
now occupied and that there was nowhere else to go.
Eventually they were forcibly evicted, with their homes
burnt and bulldozed. Their possessions were destroyed.

15

I draw here from the Grootboom opinion, supra note I.

16 Ibid. at para. 6.
17

Ibid. at paras. 4 & 7.
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At this point they found shelter on a sports field in
Wallacedene, under temporary structures consisting of
plastic sheets. It was at this stage that they contended
their constitutional rights had been violated. It is
worthwhile to pause over the nature of human existence
for those at Wallacedene. For them, insecurity was a fact
of daily life. It should not be controversial to say that the
status of citizenship is badly compromised for people in
such conditions.

The South African Constitution
Two provisions were of central importance to the
plaintiffs' claim. The first is section 26, which provides:
26. (1) Everyone has the right to have
access to adequate housing.
(2) The State must take reasonable
legislative and other measures, within
its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realisation of this right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their
home, or have their home demolished,
without an order of court made after
considering all the relevant
circumstances. No legislation may
permit arbitrary evictions.
The second was section 28(1)(c), limited to children.
That section reads:
28. (1) Every child has the right (b) to family care or parental care, or
to appropriate alternative care when
removed from the family environment.
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic
health care services and' social
services.
At the outset several points should be made about
these sections. First, section 26(3) imposes a duty on the
private sector, not only on government. Under this
section, it is unconstitutional for a private person to evict
another private person, or to demolish a home, without
judicial permission. From the constitutional point of
view, this is a striking innovation, for constitutions do not
typically impose obligations on private landlords. From
the standpoint of economic policy, it also raises several
interesting questions. Obviously, the goal of section 26(3)
is to ensure that poor people continue to have housing;
but the creation of a kind of property right in continued
occupancy is likely to have some unintended bad
consequences. If it is difficult to evict people, landlords
will have a decreased incentive to provide housing in the
first instance. The result might be a diminished stock of
private housing. Another result might be extensive
private screening of prospective tenants, since landlords

will be entirely aware that once a tenancy is allowed, it
will be very difficult to terminate it. The extent of these
effects is of course an empirical question.
For purposes of constitutional interpretation, the
largest puzzle has to do with the relationship between
sections 26 and 28. It would be possible to read section
28 as giving children unqualified rights to various goods
- ensuring that children have those goods even if
resources are scarce. On this view, the government has an
absolute obligation to ensure that children eat, are
housed, and have health care and social services. Under
this interpretation, section 26 creates as qualified right for
everyone ("progressive realisation") whereas section 28
requires an unqualified right for children in particular.
Whether or not it is correct, this is a textually plausible
reading.
The lower court proceeded in exactly this way,
holding that section 28 creates a freestanding, absolute
right, on the part of children, to the protections thus
mentioned. On this interpretation, the rights are not
qualified by "available resources" or by the "progressive
realisation" clause.'" Perhaps children are given, by that
clause, two sets of rights: first to the care of adults,
preferably parents; second to state support of basic needs.

GROOTBOOM IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT
In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court rejected this
interpretation of section 28. At the same time, it held that
section 26 imposes a judicially enforceable duty on
government; that what is required is "reasonableness";
and that the plaintiffs' constitutional rights had been
violated, because of the absence of a program to ensure
provide "temporary relief' for those without shelter. In
short, the Court held that the Constitution required not
only a long-term plan to provide low-income shelter, but
also a system to ensure short-term help for people who
had no place to live. I believe that this is the first time
that the high court of any nation has issued a ruling of
this general sort. What is most striking about this ruling
is the distinctive and novel approach to socio-economic
rights, requiring not shelter for everyone, but sensible
priority-setting, with particular attention to the plight of
those with the greatest need. I will say more by way of
evaluation below; let us begin by tracing the Court's
explanation of its decision.

is Grootboom v. Oostenberg Municipality and Others 2000 (3)
BCLR 277(c).
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Section 26
1. A note from international law
The movement for socio-economic rights cannot be
understood without reference to international law, which
firmly recognizes such rights, and which seems to put the
weight of international opinion behind them. Hence the
Court began by emphasizing the significant background
provided by the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and CulturalRights 9 (a covenant signed but not
yet ratified by South Africa).20
Section 11.1 of the Covenant provides that the
parties "recognize the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, including
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the
continuous improvement of living conditions." Hence the
"parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the
realization of this right." A more general provision of the
Covenant, applicable to all relevant rights, makes a
promise "to take steps ... to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realisation of the rights recognized in the Covenant by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of
legislative measures."'"
But what does this mean? The United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is
entrusted with monitoring the performance of states under
the Covenant. In its interpretive comments, the
Committee urges that states face a "minimum core
obligation," consisting of a duty to "ensure the
satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels
of each of the rights." 22 The Constitutional Court referred
to this idea with some interest, suggesting the possibility
of "minimum core obligations" imposed by section 26.
But, in the Court's view, this idea has many problems
because judicial enforcement would require a great deal
of information to be placed before the court, in order to
"determine the minimum core in any given context. '23 In
this case, sufficient information was lacking, and in any
event the Court thought that it would not be necessary to
define the minimum core in order to assess Grootboom's
complaint.2
2. Text and context
The Court's more specific analysis of section 26
began with an emphasis on the fact that all people have a
right, not to shelter regardless of financial constraints, but

"'
20

2

2
3

24

to legislative and other measures designed to achieve "the
progressive realization of this right." At the same time,
the state, and "all other entities and persons," are
constitutionally required "to desist from preventing or
impairing the right of access to adequate housing."' By
itself this idea is quite ambiguous: what counts as
prevention or impairment?
The Court explained that to implement the right, the
state faced two kinds of duties. With respect to "those
who can afford to pay for adequate housing," the state's
duty is to "unlock[] the system, providing access to
housing stock and a legislative framework to facilitate
self-built houses through planning laws and access to
finance."26 What is most striking here is the Court's
emphasis on the "unlocking" role of the Constitution.On
one interpretation, at least, the state is under a duty to ban
a system of monopoly in housing - to create markets
sufficiently flexible to provide housing to those who can
pay for it. But it is not clear that this is all, or even most,
of what the Court had in mind. The idea of "planning
laws" and "access to finance" might be taken to mean
something other than, or in addition to, a competitive
housing market. But it is certainly worth noticing that the
analysis of a duty for "those who can afford to pay"
operates along its own separate track, requiring a kind of
open housing market for those with the resources to
participate.
For poor people, of course, the state's obligation is
different. Here the constitutional duty might be
discharged through "programmes to provide adequate
social assistance to those who are otherwise unable to
support themselves and their dependents."'27 In this case,
the central issue was whether the government had created
"reasonable" measures to ensure progressive realization
of the right. The Court concluded that it had not,
notwithstanding the extensive public apparatus to
facilitate access to housing. The reason for this
conclusion was simple:28
there is no express provision to facilitate access
to temporary relief for people who have no
access to land, no roof over their heads, for
people who are living in intolerable conditions
and for people who are in crisis because of
natural disasters such as floods or fires, or
because their homes are under threat of
demolition.
The Court acknowledged that it would be acceptable
not to have a provision for those in desperate need "if the
nationwide housing programme would result in

Supra note 6.
Grootboom, supra note 1 at para. 27, note 29.
Article 2.1
The interpretive comment is cited in Grootboom, supra note 1 at
para. 29.
Ibid. at para. 33.

Ibid.

2
27

"

Ibid. at para. 34.
Ibid. at para. 36.
Ibid.
Ibid. at para. 52.
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affordable houses for most people within a reasonably
short time."29 Note that "most people" does not mean all
people; hence, the clear implication is that a deprivation
of housing for some would not necessarily be
unreasonable or inconsistent with the constitutional plan.
In this respect, the constitutional right involved the
creation of a system of a certain kind rather than the
creation of fully individual protections. But under the
existing governmental program at the national level, it
could not be said that "most people" would have
"affordable houses" within a reasonably short time.
Hence the nation's housing program was found to be
constitutionally unacceptable insofar as:3 0
it fails to recognize that the state must provide
for relief for those in desperate need. ... It is
essential that a reasonable part of the national
housing budget be devoted to this, but the
precise allocation is for the national government
to decide in the first instance.
The Court also acknowledged that the constitutional
obligation might be adequately carried out at the local
level and that the local government, Cape Metro, had put
in place its own land programme specifically to deal with
desperate needs. But that programme had not been
implemented, in large part because of an absence of
adequate budgetary support from the national
government. "Recognition of such needs in the
nationwide housing programme requires" the national
government "to plan, budget and monitor the fulfilment
of immediate needs and the management of crises. This
shall ensure that a significant number of desperate people
in need are afforded relief, though not all of them need
receive it immediately."'"
In the Court's view, the Constitutiondoes not create
a right to "shelter or housing immediately upon
demand,"32 but it does create a right to a "coherent, coordinated programme designed to meet"33 constitutional
obligations. The obligation of the state is therefore to
create such a program, including reasonable measures
specifically designed to provide "relief for people who
have no access to land, no roof over their heads, and who
are living in intolerable conditions" or crisis situations. 4
It is here that we can find a novel, distinctive, and
promising approach to a democratic constitution's socioeconomic rights, an issue that I take up in more detail
below.

Ibid. at para.
Ibid. at para.
Ibid. at para.
Ibid. at para.
Ibid. at para.
Ibid. at para.
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Section 28
So much for section 26. What of section 28, which,
it might be recalled, was understood by the lower court to
create an absolute right to shelter for children? In brief,
the Court refused to interpret section 28 in this way.
Instead, it understood section 28 to add little to the basic
requirements of section 26. In the Court's view, section
28 creates no independent socio-economic rights. This is
an exceedingly narrow reading of section 28, evidently a
product of pragmatic considerations. The Court's
responsiveness to those pragmatic considerations is itself
noteworthy, especially insofar as it suggests judicial
reluctance to intrude excessively into priority-setting at
the democratic level.
The Court's central holding was that with respect to
children, the obligation to provide shelter and the like "is
imposed primarily on parents and family, and only
alternatively on the state."35 What this means is that when
children are removed from their parents, the state must
protect the specified rights by, for example, ensuring that
children are housed and fed. But section 28 "does not
create any primary state obligation to provide shelter on
demand to parents and their children if children
are being
36
cared for by their parents or families."
To be sure, the state has some constitutional duty to
children under the care of their parents and families.
"[T]he state must provide the legal and administrative
infrastructure necessary to ensure" compliance with
section 28, through, for example, "passing laws and
creating enforcement mechanisms for the maintenance of
children, their protection from maltreatment, abuse,
neglect or degradation."37 The state is also obliged to
comply with the various independent protections of
socio-economic rights. But section 28 was found to create
no freestanding obligation for the state to shelter children
within the care of their parents. Since the children in
Grootboom were being cared for by their parents, the
state was not obliged to shelter them "in terms of section
28(1 ).38
At first glance, this is a puzzling reading of section
28(1), hardly foreordained by the text of the provision.
Apparently the Court was led to that reading by what it
saw as the "anomalous result" of giving those with
children "a direct and enforceable right to housing under"
that section, while depriving those "who have none or
whose children are adult. ' 39 This would be anomalous
because it would allow parents to have special access to

Ibid. at para.
Ibid.
17
Ibid. at para.
3
Ibid. at para.
3'9 Ibid. at para.
35

77.

36
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shelter if and because they had children. In any case a
holding to this effect would make children into "stepping
stones to housing for their parents."' But would this
really be so anomalous? It might seem to make sense to
say that children should have a particular priority here that their right should be more absolute - and hence that
adults with children would have a preferred position.
Why would that view be especially peculiar?
The Court also expressed a stronger concern. If
children were taken to have an absolute right to shelter,
the document's limitations on socio-economic rights
would be quite undone. "The carefully constructed
constitutional scheme for progressive realisation of socioeconomic rights would make little sense if it could be
trumped in every case by the rights of children.""' Here,
I think, is the heart of the Court's skepticism about the
idea that section 28 should be taken to create absolute
rights. If section 28 were so understood, it would trump
even reasonable priority-setting, thus keeping the state
from deciding that in view of sharply limited resources,
certain needs were even more pressing.

Evaluation
What I will urge here is that the approach of the
South African Constitutional Court answers a number of
questions about the proper relationship among socioeconomic rights, constitutional law, and democratic
deliberation. There should be little question that people
who live in desperate conditions cannot live good lives.
People who live in such conditions are also unable to
enjoy the status of citizenship.
On the other hand, legislatures in poor nations, and
perhaps in less poor ones, cannot easily ensure that
everyone lives in decent conditions. An especially
plausible concern with socio-economic rights is the
difficulty, for courts, of steering a middle course between
two straightforward positions: (a) that socio-economic
rights are nonjusticiable and (b) that socio-economic
rights create an absolute duty, on government's part, to
ensure protection for everyone who needs them. The
second position is, of course, the standard approach to
most constitutional rights. If the government has violated
someone's right to free speech, or to freedom of religion,
it does not matter that the rights of most people, or almost
everyone else, have been respected.

40 Ibid.
41

Ibid.

As I have emphasized, however, all rights have
costs.' 2 The right to free speech, or for that matter to
freedom from police abuse, will not be protected unless
taxpayers are willing to fund ajudicial system willing and
able to protect that right and that freedom. In fact, a
system committed to free speech is also likely to require
taxpayer resources to be devoted to keeping open certain
arenas where speech can occur, such as streets and parks.
In protecting the most conventional rights, the
government must engage in some form of priority-setting.
But when cases go to court, conventional rights are and
can be fully protected at the individual level, and not
merely through the creation of some kind of "reasonable"
overall system for protection. The existence of a
reasonable overall system for protecting free speech
rights is not a defense to a claim that, in a particular case,
a right to free speech has been violated.
By their very nature, socio-economic rights are
different on this count, certainly in the light of the
"progressive realisation" clause.' 3 No one thinks that
every individual has an enforceable right to full
protection of the interests at stake. In these circumstances
it is difficult indeed to find an approach that avoids two
unappealing courses: creation of fully enforceable
individual rights or a conclusion of 'complete
nonjusticiability. The only alternative to these extremes
is an approach to public law that is generally unfamiliar
in constitutional law but that is the ordinary material of
administrative law, governing judicial control of
administrative agencies: a requirement of reasoneA
judgment, including reasonable priority-setting.
In a typical administrative law case, an agency is
faced with a burden of explanation. It must show why it
has adopted the program that it has chosen; it must
account for its failure to adopt a program of a different
sort. For courts, a special attraction of this position is that
it protects against administrative arbitrariness while also
recognizes the democratic pedigree of the agency and the
simple fact of limited resources. If an agency has
allocated resources in a rational way, it has acted
lawfully.

42
'

Holmes and Sunstein, supra note 3.
Section 26(2) of the South Africa Constitution.
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What the South African Constitution Court has
basically done is to adopt an administrativelaw model of
socio-economic rights.Courts using that model are hardly
unwilling to invalidate an agency's choices as arbitrary.
That, in effect, is what the Constitutional Court did in
Grootboom. The Court required government to develop,
and fund, a program by which a large number of poor
people are given access to emergency housing. What the
Court called for is some sort of reasonable plan, designed
to ensure that relief will be forthcoming to a significant
percentage of poor people. On this view, the Constitution
constrains government, not by ensuring that everyone
receives shelter, but by requiring government to devote
more resources than it otherwise would to the problem of
insufficient housing for the poor. More particularly, the
Court requires government to maintain a plan for
emergency relief for those who need it. Such a plan
would fill the gap found unacceptable in Grootboom.
But there is a twist here. For those whose socioeconomic rights are violated, the real problem is one of
government inaction - a failure to implement a program
of the sort that, in the view of some, the Constitution
requires. The plaintiffs in Grootboom were seeking
government action that had not, to that point, been
forthcoming, in the particular form of a right to
emergency relief. Hence the Grootboom Court's
approach is most closely connected to a subset of
administrative law principles, involving judicial review
of inaction by government agencies. In cases of this kind,
everyone knows that the agency faces resource
constraints and that in the face of a limited budget, any
reasonable priority-setting will be valid and perhaps even
free from judicial review. At the same time, there should
be a duty of reasonableness in priority-setting, and an
agency decision that rejects a statutory judgment, or that
does not take statutory goals sufficiently seriously, should
be held invalid. In the constitutional context, this is what
the South African Court ruled in Grootboom.
The broader point here is that a constitutional right
to shelter, or to food, can strengthen the hand of those
who might be unable to make much progress in the
political arena, perhaps because they are unsympathetic
figures, perhaps because they are disorganized and lack
political power. A socio-economic guarantee can have an
enduring function. It can do so in part by promoting a
certain kind of deliberation, not by preempting it, as a
result of directing political attention to interests that
would otherwise be disregarded in ordinary political life.

FORUM

CONSTITUTIONNEL

CONCLUSION
Should constitutions protect social and economic
rights? It is certainly relevant that if basic needs are not
met, people cannot really enjoy the status of citizens. A
right to minimal social and economic guarantees can be
justified, not only on the ground that people in desperate
conditions will not have good lives, but also on the
ground that democracy requires a certain independence
and security for all citizens. But there are many
complexities here. A government might attempt to meet
people's needs in multiple ways, perhaps by creating
incentives to ensure that people will help themselves,
rather than looking to government. Perhaps there is no
special need for constitutional safeguards here; perhaps
this is an issue that can be settled democratically. In any
case social and economic guarantees threaten to put
courts in a role for which they are quite ill-suited. While
modern constitutions tend to protect those guarantees, we
can understand the judgment that, in some nations, they
would create more trouble than they are worth.
In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court of South
Africa was confronted, for the first time, with the
question of how, exactly, courts should protect socioeconomic rights. The Court's approach suggests, also for
the first time, the possibility of providing that protection
in a way that is respectful of democratic prerogatives and
the simple fact of limited budgets.
In making clear that the socio-economic rights are
not given to individuals as such, the Court was at pains to
say that the right to housing is not absolute. This
suggestion underlies the narrow interpretation of the
provision involving children and also the Court's
unambiguous suggestion that the state need not provide
housing for everyone who needs it. What the
constitutional right requires is not housing on demand,
but a reasonable program for ensuring access to housing
for poor people, including some kind of program for
ensuring emergency relief. This approach ensures respect
for sensible priority-setting, and close attention to
particular needs, without displacing democratic
judgments about how to set priorities. This is now the
prevailing approach to the constitutional law of socioeconomic rights in South Africa.
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Of course, the approach leaves many issues
unresolved. Suppose that the government ensured a
certain level of funding for a program of emergency
relief; suppose too that the specified level is challenged
as insufficient. The Court's decision suggests that
whatever amount allocated must be shown to be
"reasonable"; but what are the standards to be used in
resolving a dispute about that issue? The deeper problem
is that any allocation of resources for providing shelter
will prevent resources from going elsewhere - for
example, for AIDS treatment and prevention, for
unemployment compensation, for food, for basic income
support. Undoubtedly the Constitutional Court will listen
carefully to government claims that resources not devoted
to housing are being used elsewhere. Undoubtedly those
claims will be stronger if they suggest that some or all of
the resources are being used to protect socio-economic
rights of a different sort.

Cass R. Sunstein
Karl N.Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of
Jurisprudence, University of Chicago, Law School
and Department of Political Science.

What is most important, however, is the
Constitutional Court's adoption of a novel and highly
promising approach to judicial protection of socioeconomic rights. The ultimate effects of the approach
remain to be seen. But by requiring reasonable programs,
with careful attention to limited-budgets, the Court has
suggested the possibility of assessing claims of
constitutional violations without at the same time
requiring more than existing resources will allow. And in
so doing, the Court has provided the most convincing
rebuttal yet to those who have claimed, in the abstract
quite plausibly, thatjudicial protection of socio-economic
rights could not possibly be a good idea. We now have
reason to believe that a democratic constitution, even in
a poor nation, is able to protect those rights, and to do so
without placing an undue strain on judicial capacities.Q
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